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ABSTRACT
Three studies reexamined the findings of Leary, Landel, and Patton (1996), by 
investigating how various domains of self-esteem (SE) are related to the tendency to 
share the emotions with others following an embarrassing event. In Study 1, participants 
completed measures of dominance, status, prestige, mate value, and global SE, and also 
performed an embarrassing singing task. Following the singing task, some participants 
were given the chance to communicate their embarrassment to the researcher, whereas 
others were not. It was found that dominant individuals experienced significantly less 
embarrassment after conveying their embarrassment to the researcher than if their 
feelings remained private. In contrast, low-dominance individuals’ levels of self-reported 
embarrassment did not differ whether or not they had the opportunity to express their 
feelings to others. Study 2, which involved a large exploratory factor analysis, improved 
upon the existing measures of dominance, status, and prestige. Study 3 was an attempt to 
replicate Study 1, using the improved measures of dominance, status, and prestige. 
However, the study failed to duplicate the finding that the motivated expression of 
embarrassment was related to dominance. Instead, it was found that self-reported 
embarrassment was related to status and global SE. The relative merit of Study 1 and 
Study 3 for understanding individual differences in reactions to embarrassment are 
discussed.
STATUS, DOMINANCE, OR PRESTIGE?
INTRODUCTION
Individuals differ widely in their susceptibility to embarrassment. Whereas some 
appear practically immune to the emotion, others become easily embarrassed by silly 
social mishaps. Differences also arise in how individuals respond to feelings of 
embarrassment. Whereas some are able to laugh off or joke about their own 
embarrassment, others deal with a crippling fear of awkward social interactions. If 
embarrassment can have such a significant impact on the social life, it is important to 
understand how the structure of personality is related to the emotion of embarrassment. 
The present studies seek to understand such individual differences in the experience of 
and reaction to embarrassing feelings.
Embarrassment as a Self-Conscious Emotion
Emotional experiences are extremely personal, yet their causes and ramifications 
are largely social. For no group of feelings is this truer than the so-called “self-conscious 
emotions,” such as embarrassment, shame, and guilt. Each of these emotions is 
experienced when people feel they are being judged, either by self or others (Fisher & 
Tangney, 1995). One of the earliest definitions of embarrassment, written by Goffman 
(1967), declared that embarrassment occurred because of “unfulfilled expectations” (p. 
105). According to Goffman, people know how to behave, given their own social 
identities, and they feel embarrassed when they have failed to maintain that social
2
3standard. In a recent review of research on embarrassment, Keltner and Buswell (1997) 
identify embarrassment as being distinct from shame and guilt, based on triggering events 
and physiological responses. Embarrassment is caused by the violation of social 
conventions, including physical mishaps such as tripping, or uncomfortable social 
interactions such as public speaking. In contrast, shame involves failing to live up to the 
expectations of oneself or of others, perhaps by hurting someone’s feelings, and guilt is 
incited by actions such as cheating, which involve going against one’s own moral rules.
Sabini, Garvey, and Hall (2001) take a slightly different view of the distinction 
between shame and embarrassment. In a series of studies, they reported that individuals 
experience shame when they personally think a flaw in the self has been revealed, but 
experience embarrassment when they think others believe a flaw in the self has been 
revealed. For example, spilling wine on a white carpet causes embarrassment because it 
makes others believe a person is clumsy, but does not necessarily make the spiller believe 
he or she is clumsy. The debate between Sabini and colleagues’ theory of a distinction 
between embarrassment and shame based on perceived vs. actual flaws, and the theory 
that hinges the difference on the violations of social conventions vs. moral rules (Keltner 
& Buswell, 1997) is ongoing.
The varying physiological and behavioral responses associated with self- 
conscious feelings also help in teasing apart the emotions. For example, embarrassment 
displays involve gaze aversion, a downward movement of the head, smiling, and often 
blushing, whereas expressions of shame involve only a downcast head and gaze (Keltner 
& Buswell, 1996). On the other hand, a guilty expression is less clearly distinguishable 
from pained or sympathetic expressions, and when shown photographs of prototypical
4embarrassment, shame, and guilt displays, people can reliably distinguish between 
embarrassment and shame, but are unable to identify guilty expressions consistently 
(Keltner & Buswell, 1996). Recent studies have begun to demonstrate that 
embarrassment is a universally recognized emotion. In a study by Haidt and Keltner 
(1999), participants in the United States and India were able to distinguish facial 
expressions of embarrassment from displays of shame and amusement.
The ways in which people respond to the emotions of shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment offer another valuable tool for distinguishing among the constructs. 
Studies of personal narratives have revealed that participants believe the social responses 
to embarrassment to be shorter in duration, as well as more light-hearted, often involving 
humor and smiling (Miller & Tangney, 1994). In contrast, the experience of shame tends 
to be much more negative and prolonged, involving anger, disgust, and attempts to take 
actions such as apologizing in an effort to dispel the shameful feelings.
However, not all emotion researchers have viewed embarrassment as being a 
distinct emotion. Darwin (1872) considered the significance of the blush in his book The 
Expression o f  the Emotions in Man and Animals, but made no mention of embarrassment. 
Fessler (1999), an anthropologist, sought to adopt a universal way of defining emotions, 
something that has been widely attempted by psychologists, but largely avoided by 
members of his field. In his search for universal emotional displays, Fessler focused on 
the emotions of shame and pride, neglecting embarrassment other than to note that it is 
seen as a distinct emotion only in Western cultures. Fessler identified two forms of 
shame, one that results simply from being in the presence of higher-status others, and one 
that is felt after a social rule or norm has been violated and the violation is known to
5someone else. It is easy to see how Fessler’s second form of shame is related to previous 
descriptions of embarrassment (Goffman, 1967). To this point, all of these accounts focus 
on the antecedents of embarrassment, but determining the function of embarrassment 
offers another useful tool for determining whether or not it is a distinct emotion.
The Function o f  Embarrassment
Embarrassment appears to be a unique emotion as defined by its prototypical 
display; however a distinct emotion is also defined, in part, by its distinct function. In a 
review of the literature on the moral emotions, Haidt (2003) argued that the “self- 
conscious emotions seem designed to help people navigate the complexities of fitting into 
groups without triggering the contempt, anger, and disgust of others” (p.859).
Researchers such as Frijda (1986) emphasized the interpersonal functions of emotions. 
Fridja discussed the behavioral responses to feelings such as shame and embarrassment 
as comprising a category of interactive expressions. The most important function of these 
emotional displays is to influence the behavior of others. For example, the submissive 
behaviors that are part of the embarrassment display, including gaze aversion and the 
hanging of the head, are meant to directly influence the behaviors of a more dominant 
individual by demonstrating that the embarrassed individual is aware an interpersonal 
error has been made.
This is one prominent explanation of the function of embarrassment; that is, the 
emotion serves as an appeasement display. Researchers have proposed that displays of 
embarrassment may serve to pacify others who observe the embarrassment-inducing 
behavior (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The appeasement theory of embarrassment is based 
on studies of appeasement behavior in other species. Nonhuman appeasement displays
6include actions such as averting the eyes and assuming a closed, submissive posture, and 
bear close resemblance to human appeasement displays. Among humans, these displays 
serve to restore social bonds that have been threatened by a transgression. Keltner,
Young, and Buswell (1997) reviewed the findings from a series of studies in which 
participants were presented with photos of individuals demonstrating prototypical 
emotional displays, including embarrassment and shame, and the participants were asked 
to imagine that the individuals in the photos had made some kind of social transgression. 
The participants then rated how much amusement, antipathy, and sympathy they felt in 
response to the photo. It was found that the participants felt more amusement after 
viewing the embarrassed photos and more sympathy following the shame pictures. 
Embarrassment and shame thus appear to be unique emotions that evoke different 
conciliatory feelings in observers.
Miller and Leary (1992) argued that the effects of the embarrassment display 
affect both the observer and the individual experiencing the emotion. Because of the 
uniqueness of the embarrassment display, it is recognizable to the observer, 
demonstrating that the individual who has committed the social transgression is 
experiencing negative feelings. For the individual experiencing the embarrassment, the 
private sensations are so negative and uncomfortable that the individual is motivated to 
behave prosocially in an effort to relieve the immediate feelings of discomfort. The 
individual may then even be motivated to act in such a manner as to avoid experiencing 
the same feelings in the future.
One major indication that an individual is embarrassed can be blushing. Blushing 
is a common, albeit usually undesirable and uncomfortable physiological response,
7involving the reddening of the face and neck. Leary and Meadows (1991) proposed that 
blushing is an involuntary response indicating humility, which is meant to mitigate 
potential negative evaluations of the blusher by others and to ensure that the individual 
remains socially included. Much as in the appeasement theory of embarrassment, the 
blush is a reaction that relates largely to evaluating and maintaining status within a group. 
Leary and Meadows found that blushing frequency was correlated with measures such as 
self-esteem and interaction anxiety, which tap into a person’s levels of comfort and 
success in interpersonal interactions.
Another correlational study investigated the relationship between 
embarrassability, blushing, and dominance. Halberstadt and Green (1993) tested the 
placation theory of blushing as outlined by Leary and Meadows (1991), hypothesizing 
that if the blush serves to appease others, then those who blush often should be high in 
submissiveness. Participants completed measures of blushing propensity, 
embarrassability, and dominance. Dominance was found to be inversely correlated with 
both blushing propensity, or tendency to blush, and embarrassability, offering support for 
the placation theory of blushing. This relationship between dominance and 
embarrassability suggests that an individual’s social status could be critically important in 
influencing the experiences of and reactions to embarrassing situations.
Status and Embarrassment
Other researchers have attempted to experimentally manipulate status and to 
gauge the impact of status on individuals’ reactions to an embarrassing situation. As part 
of a study conducted by Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, & Wetter (1990), high- or low- 
status participants were led to believe that they had spilled a cup of cola onto the valuable
or inexpensive belongings of a confederate. High-status participants were asked to 
conduct interviews on behalf of an absent graduate student researcher, whereas low-status 
participants were told that they would be interviewed by an experimenter. Just prior to 
the beginning of the interview, a confederate posing as either the interviewer or 
interviewee distracted the participant, while an experimenter in the next room pulled a 
string to upset a drink cup that had been left on the table onto the confederate’s 
possessions. The researchers’ videotaped the participants’ reactions to the spill and coded 
the behaviors for verbal helping behaviors such as saying, “What can I do?” and 
behavioral helping such as drying the items. It was found that when the consequences of 
the spill were severe (i.e. the ruined property was valuable), there was no difference in 
amount remedial effort extended by the high- and low-status participants. In contrast, 
when the damaged belongings were inexpensive, low-status participants extended more 
effort to compensate for the spill. The study also demonstrated that low-status women 
endeavored to do more to make up for their effort than did low-status men. These 
findings suggest that following an embarrassing event, low-status individuals need to be 
more concerned with appeasing a high-status other, than do high-status others with 
appeasing someone of lower status.
Keltner (1995) investigated the hypothesis, derived from an appeasement account 
of embarrassment, that because embarrassment displays signal submissiveness, such 
displays should be more readily recognizable when they come from a low-status other. In 
this study, those low in status were operationally defined as individuals who came from 
minority groups that have been historically viewed as having low status. The low-status 
targets included women and African-Americans. Undergraduate participants were shown
9a video of different undergraduate targets making prototypical displays of emotions 
including amusement, embarrassment, and disgust, and the participants were asked to 
identify the emotion being demonstrated. In one series of studies, male and female 
participants viewed emotional displays by male and female targets. In support of the 
hypothesis, observers attributed more embarrassment to female targets than to male. 
During a follow-up study, male and female undergraduate participants identified the 
emotions displayed by African-American and Caucasian adolescent male targets. The 
embarrassment displays of African-American targets were judged more accurately than 
were Caucasian targets, and more embarrassment was attributed to the African-American 
targets than to the Caucasian targets. It appears that the embarrassment displays of low- 
status individuals, which are meant to appease others, are more readily recognizable than 
the embarrassment displays of high-status individuals.
Embarrassment is an inherently negative emotional state from which sufferers 
crave relief. As demonstrated by the previous study, the prototypical embarrassment 
display is readily recognizable to observers; and yet individuals who experience 
embarrassment often take additional steps to relieve their discomfort and repair their 
social image, such as making jokes, or offering apologies (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). 
Taking such remedial actions helps to demonstrate that embarrassed individuals 
understand that they have committed a social blunder and seek forgiveness from those 
who witnessed the norm violation (Goffman, 1967).
One of the more commonly used strategies following an embarrassing 
predicament is to use humor either by laughing or by making a joke or sarcastic 
comment. Fink and Walker (1977) studied the use of this strategy during embarrassing
10
situations involving either equal- or unequal- status pairs. Undergraduate participants in 
the study had an embarrassing telephone conversation with a researcher who identified 
herself as being a high school student (low status), an undergraduate (equal status), or a 
professor (high status). Participants were found to laugh more when interacting with 
equal-status others than when talking to low- or high-status others. The amount of verbal 
humor in the form of joking or bantering used by the participants was not related to 
status. However, it is questionable whether this status manipulation is a relevant one for 
undergraduate students. Undergraduates certainly do compare themselves to their fellow 
students in evaluating their social status, but it seems unlikely that undergraduates 
compare themselves to either high school students or college professors in assessing their 
place in the status hierarchy. Toward this end, it makes sense that participants would use 
an appeasement strategy such as laughter when conversing with a peer, but not employ a 
similar strategy when interacting with a professor or high school student. In the context 
of casual phone conversation, undergraduates may simply be more concerned about the 
impressions a fellow student is forming of them.
Another study that investigated the relationship between embarrassment, status, 
and humor was conducted by Sueda and Wiseman (1992). They investigated the types of 
remediation that Japanese and North American participants said they would use in 
various scenarios that described events taking place in an organizational setting and 
involved a superior, a peer, or a subordinate member of the hypothetical organization. 
Participants read a series of scenarios about embarrassing events that resulted from 
accidents, misidentification, tripping, misunderstandings, failing to live up to others’ 
expectations, physiological embarrassment, empathy for others who were embarrassed,
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and rudeness, and were asked to rate how likely they were to use remedial strategies 
including apologizing, justification, making excuses, remediation, humor, aggression, 
avoidance, stating that something has been done wrong, or doing nothing. Japanese 
participants stated that they would tend not to use humor in situations involving others of 
unequal status. As in the Fink and Walker study, it was found that humor was identified 
as the strategy that would be used most among equals, and was said to be used more by 
North Americans than by Japanese participants. In situations involving others of unequal 
status, North American respondents adopted the strategy of simply stating that something 
had been done wrong. The researchers also noted that the Japanese participants were 
especially sensitive to status differentials among coworkers, perhaps relating to their 
culture’s concern with the social self and the increased emphasis placed on public 
presentation. Perhaps most relevant to understanding embarrassment remediation as a 
way of negotiating a status hierarchy was the finding of significant differences between 
the status groups in the use of an aggressive strategy, with individuals more likely to say 
they would aggress against unequal- than equal-status others. It was also found that 
individuals stated they were more likely to adopt an avoidant strategy when interacting 
with unequal-status others. This study, like the Fink and Walker study, raises questions 
about how individuals assess their social standing. It is possible that in a corporate 
setting, individuals monitor their social status only in relation to others on the same rung 
of the corporate ladder. It may be that the relation to superiors and subordinates is not as 
significant as the comparison to relative equals.
12
The Motivation to Express Embarrassment
Leary, Landel, and Patton (1996) investigated the appeasement theory of 
embarrassment, offering experimental evidence that individuals who experience 
embarrassment are motivated to engage in remedial behaviors to (a) relieve their own 
discomfort, and (b) improve their social image. Participants in their first study were asked 
to sing the overly sentimental song, Feelings (Albert, 1975) in front of a researcher, 
which served as a threat to the social image. Some participants were then given the 
opportunity to record their emotional state on paper, whereas others were not. Of those 
participants who wrote down their emotions, half then had their answers examined by the 
researcher. Participants whose responses were made public to the researcher subsequently 
reported being less embarrassed on a follow-up questionnaire than participants who were 
given no outlet for expressing their feelings, offering support for the idea that the public 
expression of embarrassment decreases discomfort. In the second study, participants were 
recorded while singing Feelings. During the experimental manipulation, participants’ 
level of facial blushing was ostensibly monitored by a thermistor that had actually been 
set to give a reading indicating that the participants were blushing. For each participant in 
the blushing condition, the researcher replayed a portion of participant’s singing and then 
commented that the participant’s face appeared to be flushed. The researcher went on to 
say that hearing the tape must have caused the participant to blush. For each participant in 
the nonblushing condition, the researcher replayed the tape and remarked that the 
increase in flushing was due to the normal effects of exertion of the facial muscles during 
the singing task. Participants whose blushing was attributed to arousal rather than to 
embarrassment subsequently gave themselves more positive self-evaluations than did
13
those whose embarrassment went unrecognized by the researcher. This suggests that 
when an embarrassment display such as blushing does not serve to convey a positive 
image of the self, embarrassed individuals will turn to other means of conveying a 
positive image of the self, in hopes of repairing the social image. Individuals appear to be 
motivated to convey their embarrassment to others, such that if one remedial strategy 
fails, they turn to another to make their feelings known to others.
Displays of embarrassment do appear to serve a remedial function, but it would 
seem that individuals sometimes have much to lose by publicly acknowledging a 
shortcoming. For example, when teased about private thoughts, people who appear 
embarrassed may actually lend credence to others’ unfounded accusations (Leary et al., 
1996). This is a situational factor, but there may also be stable personality factors that 
contribute to the motivation to communicate embarrassment to others. The present study 
will reexamine the results of Leary and colleagues by measuring the moderating effects 
of various domains of self-esteem. Much of the previously cited research suggests that 
dominance, status, or some other related dimension is important in understanding 
reactions to embarrassing situations, but it remains unclear which domain is most 
relevant.
Status as a Domain o f  Self-esteem
Although researchers have investigated the relationship between embarrassment 
and status, they have failed to adopt a universal definition of social status and to outline 
how it differs from the construct of dominance. One potentially informative attempt to 
separate these constructs was made by anthropologists Henrich and Gil-White (2001). 
They suggested that dominance is a construct distinct from prestige, and that both
14
dominance and prestige are paths by which an individual can achieve status. Henrich and 
Gil-White defined dominance as the use of force or the threat of force to gain resources, 
whereas they defined prestige as deference that is freely given by others. Among those 
striving for dominance, the primary strategies for maintaining social rank involve 
aggressing or threatening to aggress, evoking fear on the part of subordinates, and 
engaging in grandstanding. In stark contrast, those utilizing a prestigious strategy rely on 
their unique talents and abilities to ensure their social position. “Prestige [in contrast to 
dominance] rests on merit in the eyes of others (rather than force deployed against them), 
and promotes admiration of inferiors (not their fear), a desire for proximity (not distance), 
and periods of sustained observation (not furtive glances)” (p. 170). According to 
Henrich and Gil-White, status is determined by the rewards that are reaped via either 
dominant or prestigious strategies. They see the concepts of status, dominance, and 
prestige as being routinely conflated in the social sciences, as the rewards (status) and the 
paths by which the rewards are obtained (dominance or prestige) are lumped together by 
a variety of imprecisely defined terms such as power, leadership, influence, and wealth. 
This distinction among status, dominance, and prestige raises important questions about 
the value and generalizability of previous findings concerning the relationship among 
embarrassment, status, and dominance.
Up to this point, our focus has been on how individual differences in dominance 
and status are related to the subjective experience of and reaction to embarrassing 
situations. However, one of the earliest empirical studies of embarrassment (Modigliani, 
1968) investigated the predictive value of other personality constructs, such as self­
esteem (SE) that might be related to the tendency to feel this emotion. As part of that
15
study, a large (N=  183) sample of male undergraduates completed measures of 
embarrassability, empathy, SE, test anxiety, and inadequacy. Based on the belief that 
embarrassment “is generally precipitated by an awareness that one has failed to 
demonstrate the demeanor considered appropriate to a particular social interaction, and 
hence that one is being perceived by other present as deficient -  as lacking certain 
collectively valued attributes” (p. 313), the author hypothesized that individuals high in 
traits such as empathy and test anxiety and low in general SE would be more likely to 
become embarrassed in the 26 scenarios recounted on the embarrassability scale. Scores 
on the scales were calculated such that high positive correlations indicated support for the 
author’s hypothesis. In support of the hypothesis, it was found that feelings of inadequacy 
were highly correlated with embarrassability (r = .50, p  < .01), whereas general SE (r — 
.25, p  < .01) and test anxiety (r = .33,/? < .01) were more moderately correlated. These 
results suggest that it is necessary to assess the predictive value of traits other than 
dominance and status, such as SE, that may affect the experience of embarrassment. 
According to Modigliani, embarrassment is caused by the belief that others’ perceptions 
have been negatively affected by a social transgression. Modigliani’s finding that 
embarrassability correlates with general SE suggests that a person’s reaction to others’ 
negative impressions is tied to the individual’s own self-perception.
Self-esteem is a construct that has received much attention in the social 
psychological literature, but it was not until the emergence of sociometer theory that 
evolutionary theorists found a way to explain the function of feeling good (or bad) about 
the self. Sociometer theory posits that one of the most important strategies for survival 
among early hominids was social inclusion, or being accepted by others (Leary &
16
Downs, 1995). As part of a social network, humans were afforded both protection from 
environmental threats and opportunities for reproduction, and as a result, they benefited 
from the ability to recognize when they were not receiving such social support. The 
adaptation of SE provides such a monitoring device, as it functions as a sociometer, or 
fuel-gauge, constantly checking individuals’ levels of inclusion and alerting them via 
negative affect when their social networks fail to provide for their needs. Once the alarm 
has sounded, individuals are motivated to go out and find a way to return their level of 
inclusion to an optimal level, thus relieving the negative affect. Sociometer theory 
represents an important departure from the predominant view of high SE as a goal or 
motive. Instead, according to Leary and Downs (1995), SE is a functional gauge in which 
low SE, which is indicative of a problem in the social network, can be as valuable as high 
SE.
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (2001) proposed that whereas Leary’s sociometer theory 
does provide a plausible adaptive explanation for SE, it fails to consider the breadth of 
problems facing individuals in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). 
According to their theory, a gauge that simply monitors general trends in positive or 
negative affect does not allow the individual to specifically pinpoint the source of the 
problem. Instead, Kirkpatrick and Ellis posit that individuals benefit from the ability to 
monitor their functioning in a number of different domains involving different types of 
interpersonal relationships and varied, yet domain-specific adaptive problems. Multiple 
sociometers evaluate performance in domains such as mating, within-group competition, 
between-group competition, and kin relationships. Rather than simply identifying 
problems in the various domains, the multiple sociometers have a variety of functions
17
such as guiding individuals to maximize the quality of the relationships in which they 
invest their resources. Kirkpatrick and Ellis proposed that one important gauge under the 
umbrella of within-group competition is a dominance sociometer that lets individuals 
know precisely where they fall in the hierarchy so they can appropriately choose to fight 
with or flee from a competitor. Kirkpatrick and colleagues found empirical support for 
their model when they showed that scores on self-perceived superiority (a measure of 
social dominance among college students) were predictive of aggressive tendencies 
against a same-sex competitor (Kirkpatrick, Waugh, Valencia, & Webster, 2002).
In a recent study, I reexamined Halberstadt and Green’s (1993) finding that 
dominance is inversely related to blushing propensity and embarrassability in terms of 
Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) domain-specific self-esteem model and Henrich and Gil- 
White’s distinction between status, prestige, and dominance (Buttermore, 2003). 
Participants were presented with a number of scenarios involving either friends or 
strangers and were asked to rate how likely they would be to feel embarrassment, shame, 
or guilt if they found themselves in that situation. Participants also filled out 
questionnaires assessing a variety of domains of SE. Status, regardless of the strategy 
used to obtain it (dominance or prestige) was an inverse predictor of the tendency to 
experience embarrassment. When the scenarios involved friends and acquaintances, the 
cooperative domains of social inclusion and prestige emerged as predictors of 
embarrassment, whereas the competitive domain of mate value emerged as a predictor 
when the scenarios involved strangers. Dominance also emerged as a significant predictor 
of embarrassment among friends, with more dominant behavior associated with more 
embarrassment. These findings demonstrate the importance of assessing SE from a
18
domain-specific perspective, as well as the value of distinguishing among the domains of 
status, dominance, and prestige.
Reexamining the Function o f  Embarrassment and the Relevant Domains o f  SE
Researchers have approached the relationships between personality and 
embarrassment from a variety of different perspectives. Based on the appeasement theory 
of embarrassment, researchers have investigated status and dominance as predictors of 
the remediation strategy employed by individuals. Others have focused on SE as a 
predictor of embarrassability. The present studies sought to reconcile past findings about 
status, dominance, and SE using Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) theory, which identified 
dominance as only one domain of SE. In addition, relying on Henrich and Gil-White’s 
distinction, status, dominance, and prestige were treated as three distinct domains of SE 
within the Kirkpatrick and Ellis domain-specific SE model. As part of the present studies, 
individuals’ levels of self-perceived domain-specific SE were measured, and those values 
were used to predict reactions to an embarrassing event.
The three studies reported here were designed to answer three research questions. 
First, are individuals motivated to express their embarrassment to others following a self- 
presentational predicament? This is the same research question addressed by Leary et al 
(1996), and the current studies reexamined this question by attempting to replicate the 
methodology and findings of Leary and colleagues. Recall that in support of the 
appeasement hypothesis of embarrassment, they found that individuals who had the 
opportunity to communicate their embarrassment to someone else subsequently reported 
being less embarrassed than those who did not have an opportunity to share their feelings. 
I expected to replicate this finding in the present studies.
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The second research question relied on Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) theory of 
domain-specific SE. Are any or all of the domains of SE predictive of the tendency to 
experience embarrassment? In a correlational study, Buttermore (2003) found that status, 
not dominance or prestige, was inversely related to the tendency to experience 
embarrassment in a variety of scenarios. However, Halberstadt and Green (1993) found 
that it was dominance that was inversely related to both embarrassability and blushing 
propensity. The present studies sought to clarify these findings from questionnaire studies 
in a controlled laboratory setting. Using the distinction between dominance, status, and 
prestige, as outlined by Henrich and Gil-White (2001), I expected to find further support 
for the Buttermore (2003) finding that status is the crucial predictor of the tendency to 
experience embarrassment.
With the third research question I sought to integrate an understanding of the 
motivation to express embarrassment with an understanding of individual differences 
from the perspective of domain-specific SE. More specifically, how do the various 
domains of self-esteem moderate individuals’ motivation to convey their embarrassment 
to others following an embarrassing event? Gonzales and colleagues (1990) manipulated 
social status in the laboratory and demonstrated that high- and low-status individuals 
reacted differently to an embarrassing situation. If individuals are sensitive to the 
manipulation of status in the lab, it seems likely that those who see themselves as having 
high status in their daily interactions will react differently to embarrassing events than 
will those who see themselves as low status. Rather than manipulating status, the current 
studies were designed to assess self-reported levels of status, dominance, and prestige, 
and to investigate whether individual differences in these domains were predictive of the
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motivation to communicate embarrassment as in the Leary et al. (1996) study. It was 
expected that status would have a moderating effect on the Leary et al. findings.
Study 1 was a replication of Leary et al. (1996), with the addition of measures of 
four domains of SE as well as a measure of global SE. The study was designed to test the 
degree to which the domains of status, dominance, and prestige are related to the 
tendency to experience less embarrassment after being given the opportunity to share 
one’s feelings with someone else. Due to problems with the reliability of some measures 
of domain-specific SE in Study 1, in the second study I attempted to improve the 
measures of status, dominance, and prestige. Finally, in Study 3 ,1 sought to replicate the 
results from Study 1, using the improved measures of domain-specific SE.
STUDY 1
This study was designed to replicate Leary and colleagues’ (1996) study, while 
accounting for the predictive power of various domain-specific self-esteems. As in the 
Leary et al. study, participants completed a singing task in front of a researcher. Some 
participants were then given the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the 
researcher, whereas others were not. In addition, participants completed measures of four 
distinct domains of SE, as well as a measure global SE. Due to time constraints, 
participants were not assessed on all the domains of SE as proposed by Kirkpatrick and 
Ellis (2001). Instead, participants completed measures of the domains believed to be most 
related to the tendency to express one’s emotions in the laboratory setting. These domains 
included status, dominance, prestige, and mate value.
There were three sets of predictions made about the study. The first hypothesis 
relates to the attempt to replicate Leary et al. (1996). I expected to find support for their 
conclusion that participants whose embarrassment is unknown to the researcher should 
rate themselves as more embarrassed than participants who have had a prior opportunity 
to demonstrate their feelings to the researcher. The second set of hypotheses concerns the 
predictive power of domain-specific SE. Based on previous findings (Buttermore, 2003) 
it was hypothesized that (a) domain-specific SEs would be predictive of the tendency to
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express embarrassment, (b) the domain of status would be the best predictor of 
embarrassment, and (c) global SE would not predict emotional expression above and 
beyond the predictive power of the specific domains of SE. The final hypothesis concerns 
the moderation of Leary and colleagues’ findings by domain-specific SE. It was expected 
that high-status individuals would be less embarrassed than lower status individuals after 
having the opportunity to share their embarrassment with the researcher. This final 
hypothesis is largely based on the findings from the Gonzales et al. (1990) study, that 
when the consequences of an embarrassing event were severe, high- and low-status 
participants did not differ in amount remedial effort they extended, whereas when the 
consequences of an embarrassing predicament were less, low-status participants extended 
more effort to compensate for their actions. This finding seems to suggest that when an 
embarrassing incident is relatively minor, as is presumably the case in Leary and 
colleagues’ (1996) laboratory singing task, low-status individuals feel worse than higher 
status offenders. Therefore, when given the opportunity to express their embarrassment in 
the present study, high-status participants should express less embarrassment after having 
a chance to convey their feelings than should low-status participants. For low-status 
participants, simply having their feelings made public should not go very far toward 
relieving discomfort. As in the Gonzales et al. study, low-status participants should 
require more extensive action to relieve their embarrassment.
Method
Participants
One hundred undergraduate students (50 males and 50 females) from the College 
of William and Mary participated in the study in partial fulfillment of an introductory
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psychology course requirement. Two students withdrew from the study after being told 
they would be asked to complete a singing task. Three additional participants were 
eliminated from the sample because of equipment malfunction or experimenter error 
during the experimental session, leaving a total sample size o f N  = 95 (48 males and 47 
females). The experimental sessions were conducted by two male and two female 
experimenters.
Procedure and Materials
There were three portions of the study: personality measures, singing task, and 
follow-up questionnaire. The order in which participants completed the first two parts 
was randomized. The singing task and the follow-up questionnaire were taken directly 
from the procedure as outlined by Leary et al. (1996). See Appendix A for a copy of the 
Verbatim Script. All participants signed a consent form before beginning the study (See 
Appendix B).
Personality measures. Participants completed a battery of questionnaires designed 
to measure various conceptualizations of SE. Responses on all SE assessments were 
given on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Rosenberg’s 
(1965) 10-item SE scale was included as a standard measure of global SE (See Appendix 
C). Two additional questionnaires were included in order to measure distinct domains of 
SE as outlined by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (2001).
The Self-Perceived Mating Success Scale (Landolt, Lalumiere, & Quinsey, 1995) 
measures mate value, or the degree to which members of the opposite sex see the 
respondent as an attractive potential romantic partner (See Appendix D). Sample items
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include, “Members of the opposite sex that I like, tend to like me back” and “I do not 
receive many compliments from members of the opposite sex” (reverse scored).
The Self-Perceived Social Status Scale (SSSS; Buttermore, James, & Kirkpatrick, 
2003) is a 21-item measure adapted from the California Psychological Inventory's 
Dominance Subscale (Megargee, 1972) and Leary, Cottrell, and Phillips’ (2001) Social 
Dominance Scale, with additional items generated by the researchers. The measure yields 
scores in the three domains of dominance, prestige, and status, as distinguished by 
Henrich and Gil-White (2001; See Appendix E). The 7-item dominance subscale includes 
items such as, “I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way” and “I demand 
respect from members of my peer group.” Cronbach’s alpha for the dominance subscale 
has previously been found to be .78 (Buttermore, 2003); alpha in the present study was 
.75. Prestige items include, “There are some matters on which I am considered an expert 
by others” and “Members of my peer group respect and admire me.” Alpha for the 
prestige scale has previously been reported as .78; in the present study, alpha for the 6- 
item subscale was found to be .62. The status subscale includes items such as, “I must 
admit that I try to see what others think before I take a stand” (reverse scored) and “I 
sometimes do favors for people to get on their good side” (reverse scored). Previous 
alpha levels for the status subscale have been reported as .55. In the present study, alpha 
for the 5-item subscale was .62.
Singing task. Participants were told that they were going to listen to and follow 
the instructions given to them on an instructional audiotape and that their responses 
would be recorded. In an effort to prevent the participants from making spontaneous 
expressions of their feelings, the researcher asked the participants to refrain from
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speaking unless the researcher spoke to them first. The researcher then started the 
instructional audiotape and the recording device. The researcher remained in the room 
while each participant completed the task, but was seated out of the participants’ line of 
sight and refrained from looking at the participants.
The taped instructions informed the participants that they would be introduced to 
the Morris Albert song “Feelings.” Participants first followed along on a lyrics sheet, 
while the first four stanzas of the song were played. Next, participants were instructed to 
sing along as the recording was played again. This time, participants were told to sing 
into a microphone and to imagine that they were “performing the song on stage in front 
of an audience.”
Following the singing task, participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
three conditions designed by Leary et al. (1996): public-expression, private-expression, 
and no-expression. Participants in the public- and private-expression conditions 
completed a questionnaire that asked them to rate how they felt during the singing task on 
five adjectives on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Three adjectives related to 
embarrassment (e.g. silly, embarrassed, foolish), whereas two adjectives were unrelated 
to embarrassment (e.g. bored, happy). The researcher left the room while the participant 
completed this initial questionnaire (See Appendix F). In the public-expression condition, 
the researcher then returned to the room and examined the participants’ responses, to 
ensure that the participants realized the researcher knew how they were feeling. Before 
leaving the room, the researcher instructed participants in the private-expression 
condition to place their response sheets in a large manila folder filled with other response 
sheets. This was done to make sure the researcher remained unaware of the participants’
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feelings. Participants in the no-expression condition were not asked to complete the 
initial questionnaire; therefore, as in the private-expression condition, the researcher 
remained unaware of the participants’ emotional state during the singing task. The 
private-expression condition was included in an attempt to control for the possibility that 
privately recording embarrassed feelings could serve to reduce embarrassment.
Follow-up questionnaire. As in the Leary et al. (1996) study, all participants 
completed a final questionnaire that asked them to rate on a 12-point scale from not at all 
to extremely how they felt at that moment. Five of the adjectives were related to 
embarrassment (e.g. nervous, self-conscious, foolish, embarrassed, calm), whereas two 
adjectives served as unrelated filler items (e.g. hostile, depressed). Participants were 
instructed prior to completing the final questionnaire, both verbally and in writing, that 
their responses would be examined by the experimenter (See Appendix G).
Finally, in order to establish the effectiveness of the expression manipulation, 
participants were asked two follow-up questions. The first asked whether they had 
completed a questionnaire which asked them about their feelings during the singing task. 
The second question, which was asked only of those who answered in the affirmative to 
the first question, asked whether the researcher had examined the participant’s responses 
to the questionnaire about the singing task.
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks & Preliminary Analyses
Four participants gave incorrect answers on the manipulation check items. Of 
these participants, three were in the public-expression condition. One participant 
incorrectly answered that he had not completed a questionnaire asking about his feelings
during the singing task. The other two participants failed to indicate that the researcher 
had looked at their answers to the initial questionnaire. The fourth participant to give an 
incorrect answer was in the private-expression condition and incorrectly answered that he 
had not completed the questionnaire about his feelings during the singing task. These 
errors can probably be attributed to the confusing nature of the manipulation check 
questions, rather than to problems in the methodology. When given the manipulation 
check items, participants often looked confused. Several even explained to the 
researchers that they thought such seemingly straightforward questions were actually 
meant to trick them. Nonetheless, the responses of these four participants were removed 
from the sample, leaving a sample size of N  = 91 (46 men and 45 women).
Each of the three factors of the status scale was treated as a measure of a separate 
domain of SE. The correlations among the SE scales are shown in Table 1. Of the 
measures of domain-specific SE, only dominance was not significantly positively 
correlated with global SE. The correlations were similar among males and females, with 
two exceptions. Status and dominance were significantly positively correlated for males 
(r = .41,/? < .01), and although the correlation was in the same direction among females 
(r = .26), it was not significant. Status and prestige were significantly positively 
correlated for females (r = .40,/? < .01), but the correlation was not significant among 
males (r = .12).
Replication o f  Leary et al. (1996)
The first goal of the present study was to retest the conclusions drawn by Leary et 
al. (1996). To do this, a principal components factor analysis of the seven items of the 
follow-up questionnaire was conducted to ensure that the five embarrassment items
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formed one factor. As in the Leary et al. study, I completed an oblimin rotation. Two 
factors emerged with eigenvalues of 4.00 and 1.23. All five embarrassment items showed 
high loadings (> .73) on the first factor. The two non-embarrassment items (e.g. 
depressed, hostile) showed high loadings on the second factor (> .80). Based on these 
analyses, the five embarrassment items were summed to yield a measure of self-reported 
embarrassment. Cronbach’s alpha for the five items on the follow-up questionnaire meant 
to assess self-reported embarrassment was .92.
A 2 (sex) x 3 (condition) analysis of variance was conducted on the self-reported 
embarrassment scores. There was no main effect of sex (F < 1) and the interaction of sex 
and condition was not significant (F < 1), indicating that males and females did not differ 
significantly in their reported embarrassment. Table 2 compares the means of self- 
reported embarrassment by condition, for both the Leary et al. (1996) study and the 
present study. The main finding from the Leary et al. study was that individuals in the no­
expression condition whose feelings were unknown to the researcher reported being 
significantly more embarrassed than those in the public-expression condition whose 
embarrassment was known by the researcher. In order to retest this finding, a planned 
contrast was used, in which participants in the public-expression condition were 
compared to participants in the no-expression condition (contrast coefficients = -1, 0, +1). 
Consistent with the findings of Leary and colleagues, participants who did not have the 
opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the researcher reported being more 
embarrassed than participants whose feelings were known to the researcher, F(l,88) = 
11.35, p < .001.
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Leary and colleagues (1996) also found that self-reported embarrassment in the 
private-expression condition was not significantly different from either the public or no­
expression conditions. In the present study, a planned contrast (contrast coefficients = 0, 
-1, +1) demonstrated that the private-expression condition was significantly different 
from the no-expression condition, F(l,88) = 15.07, < .001. An additional contrast
(contrast coefficients = -1, +1, 0) found that the private-expression condition did not 
differ from the public-expression condition, F(l,88) = 0.26 ,p  > .05. These two contrasts 
offer partial support for the Leary et al. findings, but Table 2 reveals very different 
patterns of results in the Leary et al. study and this replication. The mean for the private- 
expression condition in Leary and colleagues’ study fell between the public and no­
expression means, whereas the mean for the private-expression condition in the present 
study was actually slightly less than the mean for the public-expression condition.
The present study does replicate Leary and colleagues’ (1996) main finding 
concerning the differences between the public- and no-expression conditions, according 
to the statistical tests they chose to run. However, the most direct test of the hypothesis 
that individuals are motivated to share their embarrassment with others as a way to repair 
a damaged social image is to use planned contrasts to compare the levels of 
embarrassment reported by those in the public-expression condition to those in the 
private and no-expression conditions. According to an interpersonal model of 
embarrassment, I would expect the scores in the private-expression condition to look 
much like the scores in the no-expression condition, as those in the private-expression 
condition recorded their feelings immediately after the singing task, but those feelings 
remained unknown to the researcher. To test this hypothesis, the self-reported
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embarrassment of participants who had the opportunity to share their feelings with the 
researcher (public-expression) was compared to participants in the other two conditions 
whose feelings remained unknown to the researcher (contrast coefficients = -2, +1, +1). 
The results were not significant, F(l,88) = 2.69,p  =.11. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, self- 
reported embarrassment for those in the private-expression condition was on average 
actually slightly lower than embarrassment reported by those in the public-expression 
condition.
There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, as suggested by Leary 
et al. (1996), it could be that simply acknowledging embarrassment in private does help 
to partially relieve discomfort. Based on their finding that the average level of 
embarrassment reported by participants in the private-expression condition fell midway 
between the public and no-expression conditions, Leary and colleagues went on to argue 
that whereas recognizing embarrassment in private went part-way to relieving those 
feelings, publicly conveying embarrassment helped to further reduce discomfort. The 
data from the present study suggest that a private acknowledgement of foolishness may 
be just as effective as a public declaration at decreasing embarrassment.
It is also possible that a problem with the private-expression condition 
manipulation may account for the disparities between the results of the private-expression 
manipulation in the present study and in the Leary et al. (1996) study. During the present 
study, participants were asked to place their responses to the initial embarrassment 
questionnaire into a large manila folder that contained other folded copies of the 
questionnaire, whereas in the Leary et al. study participants were asked to stuff their 
completed questionnaires into a sealed box filled with other questionnaires. Participants
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in the present study may have believed that the experimenters would be able to match 
their responses on the initial questionnaire with their responses on the other scales, as the 
envelope was not sealed. If participants did believe that their answers to the initial 
questionnaire would eventually be viewed by the experimenter, the private-expression 
condition then functions like the public-expression condition, in which participants 
believed they had the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the researcher. This 
potential problem with the private-expression condition will be addressed in Study 3. 
Domain-Specific Self-Esteems as Predictors o f Embarrassment
The second major goal of Study 1 was to test whether specific domains of self­
esteem were more predictive of embarrassment than was global SE. In order to 
accomplish this, the four domain-specific SE scales, global SE, condition, and sex (males 
= +1 and females = -1) were entered into a regression equation predicting embarrassment 
on the final questionnaire. Two orthogonal contrasts were entered into each regression 
equation to account for the condition variable: Condition Contrast 1 (contrast coefficients 
= +2, -1,-1) and Condition Contrast 2 (contrast coefficients = 0, +1, -1). The regression 
coefficients for each variable are presented in Table 3. Only Condition Contrast 2 
emerged as a significant predictor of self-reported embarrassment (p = -.40, p  < .001). 
This analysis failed to offer support for the hypothesis that domain-specific SEs are 
predictive of embarrassment, but it did offer support for the prediction that global SE 
would not be a significant predictor above and beyond the predictive value of the various 
domains of SE. Based on previous findings (Buttermore, 2003), it was hypothesized that 
of the dominance, status, and prestige subscales of the SSSS, the domain of status would 
be related to self-reported embarrassment. None of the three domains emerged as a
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significant predictor of embarrassment, and it was dominance rather than status that came 
the closest to significantly predicting embarrassment (|3 = -.16,/? = .15).
Domain-specific Self-esteems as Moderators o f the Leary et al. (1996) Findings
In order to assess the degree to which the various domains of self-esteem were 
predictive of the tendency to experience less embarrassment after expressing the 
emotions, a series of multiple regression analyses was conducted. Each of the domain- 
specific SE scales was mean-centered and entered individually into a regression equation 
containing the scale scores from the other domain-specific SE measures, as well as 
effects-coded variables representing condition, sex, the interaction of sex and the domain 
of SE, and the interaction of condition and the domain of SE. Two orthogonal contrasts 
were entered into each regression equation to account for the condition variable: 
Condition Contrast 1 (contrast coefficients = +2, -1,-1) and Condition Contrast 2 
(contrast coefficients = 0, +1, -1). Of the two contrasts for condition included in each 
multiple regression, Condition Contrast 1 is of primary interest because it compares the 
public-expression condition to both of the other two conditions in which the participants 
did not have the opportunity to share their emotions with the researcher. Moreover, a test 
of the interaction between Condition Contrast 1 and each of the mean-centered domains 
of SE assesses the degree to which individuals’ SE in that domain is related to the amount 
of embarrassment they reported after having the opportunity to convey their 
embarrassment to others.
For the multiple regression equations examining the moderating effects of status, 
prestige, mate value, and global SE, the only significant predictor to emerge was 
Condition Contrast 2. As previously revealed by the planned contrasts, the significance of
Condition Contrast 2 as a predictor in the multiple regression equations indicated that the 
private-expression condition differed significantly from the no-expression condition. 
These results fail to offer support for the prediction that the interaction of status and 
condition would be a significant predictor of embarrassment, with high-status individuals 
reporting more embarrassment in the private- and no-expression conditions and less 
embarrassment after having a chance to share their emotions in the public-expression 
condition. Only the regression equation testing the predictive value of dominance showed 
a significant interaction between Condition Contrast 1 and a domain of SE (Table 4).
Table 5 presents the regression coefficients for all of the variables in this latter 
multiple regression equation that included the interaction terms for dominance. Three 
significant predictors emerged in the dominance multiple regression: dominance, 
Condition Contrast 2, and the dominance x Condition Contrast 1 interaction. Dominance 
was a significant inverse predictor of embarrassment (p = -.23, p  < .05), demonstrating 
that more dominant individuals reported less embarrassment than less dominant 
individuals. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant Dominance x 
Condition Contrast 1 interaction (p = -.56, p  < .01), such that in the public-expression 
condition there was a negative relationship between dominance and embarrassment, 
whereas there was no such relationship in the private- and no-expression conditions. 
Figure 1 presents these findings for an individual at +1 SD on dominance (high) and an 
individual at -1 SD on dominance (low).
Of all the types of SE assessed, only dominance emerged as a significant predictor 
of the tendency to share one’s emotional discomfort with others. Individuals high in 
dominance were found to mirror the main finding of the Leary et al. (1996) study, that
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individuals in the public-expression condition, who had the chance to share their 
emotions with the researcher, reported being much less embarrassed than those in both 
the private and no-expression conditions, whose feelings about the singing task remained 
private. However, the self-reported embarrassment of the less dominant individuals 
differed little between the public and private/no-expression conditions. In addition, the 
mean self-reported embarrassment scores of less dominant individuals in both conditions 
look similar to the embarrassment scores reported by the more dominant individuals in 
the private/no-expression conditions (See Figure 1).
This study failed to support the hypothesis that high-status individuals would 
express less embarrassment than would lower-status individuals after having the 
opportunity to share their feelings with someone else. Instead, this effect emerged among 
highly dominant individuals. It is only those individuals who use a dominant strategy to 
achieve their status who were greatly relieved when given the opportunity to 
communicate their levels of embarrassment. In a theoretical paper about status, Gilbert 
(1990) reviewed the literature on reconciliation between those high and low in status. 
Gilbert noted that among many nonhuman species the winners o f status competitions 
engage in behaviors that help to encourage the losers to engage in affiliative behaviors 
toward the winners. For example, the winner might groom the loser or allow the loser to 
remain in close proximity. Such actions are meant to inspire loyalty on the part of the 
lower-status other. Gilbert does not distinguish between dominant and prestigious 
strategies for achieving status in his paper; however, it might make sense to apply this 
distinction to his ideas.
According to Henrich and Gil-White (2001), a prestigious person has status freely 
conferred upon him or herself because he or she has something unique to contribute to 
the social group. Prestigious people should therefore have little concern in an 
embarrassing situation about taking remedial actions in order to apologize for a social 
infraction. Their social inclusion is secure because they have something to offer the group 
that no one else can. Dominant people, on the other hand, rely on brute force to maintain 
their positions in the hierarchy. If a dominant individual is caught doing something 
embarrassing, he or she must be more concerned about offending others and the potential 
for loss of regard than is a prestigious person. It is possible that during Study 1, more 
dominant individuals expressed more embarrassment than less dominant individuals in 
the no-expression condition because of this increased fear about the possibility of 
interpersonal rejection. However, for the minor social crime of singing an embarrassing 
song, the dominant individuals felt significant relief when given the opportunity to share 
their embarrassment with others in the public-expression condition. Perhaps on the part 
of highly dominant individuals, having their embarrassment observed by someone else, in 
their minds, served the same function as Gilbert’s reconciliation behaviors, making the 
observer of the embarrassment realize that the dominant individual had recognized his or 
her shortcomings and was willing to display conciliatory behaviors. Alternatively, it 
could be that for those dominant people in the public-expression condition, the 
opportunity to fill out a second questionnaire about their levels of embarrassment was 
taken as a chance to downplay the importance of the answers on the first questionnaire. If 
participants did not expect to have their responses on the first questionnaire examined, 
dominant individuals, who are more concerned about what others think of them, may
36
have used the second questionnaire to try to convince the observer that their performance 
on the singing task was not as negatively impactful as their previous responses might 
indicate. The low embarrassment reported by the dominant individuals could be an 
attempt at damage control and impression management. Meanwhile, for those lower in 
dominance, who were less concerned about being social rejected, the opportunity to 
convey their embarrassment, had little effect toward relieving their discomfort.
According to Leary and Miller (1992), embarrassment can be such a negative 
experience for the individual experiencing it that the individual is motivated to behave 
prosocially in an effort to relieve the discomfort. Perhaps the drop in embarrassment 
reported by more dominant individuals after having the chance to express their feelings to 
another person reflects the belief that simply making someone else aware of their 
discomfort is enough to appease the other. Perhaps the less dominant others believe it 
takes additional reconciliatory behaviors in order to make sure the other person forgives 
the faux pas. This corresponds to the finding from the Gonzales (1990) study (which did 
not distinguish between dominance and prestige), in which low-status others did more to 
attempt to make up for spilling a drink on someone else’s possessions than did higher 
status others.
STUDY 2
One major concern with the results of Study 1 is the low reliability of the SSSS 
subscales (a = .62 to .75). This is a major concern due to the reduced power for testing 
hypotheses involving these scales. The goal of Study 2 was to improve the status, 
dominance, and prestige subscales of the SSSS before attempting to replicate the first 
study. Toward this end, 19 new items were generated and added to the 21-item version of 
the SSSS used in the previous study. The revised scale was administered to a large 
sample of university undergraduates, and the responses were analyzed using exploratory 
factor analysis.
Method
Three hundred and eighty-five undergraduate students (201 males and 184 
females) at the College of William & Mary received course credit for their participation 
in this study. The participants were pooled from three separate studies including an online 
study of daily interactions, a study of testosterone and fluctuating asymmetry, and a 
replication of Study 1 of the present paper. Participants in the daily interactions study 
completed the materials electronically, whereas participants in the other two studies 
completed pencil and paper versions. Care was taken such that there was no overlap with 
students participating in more than one of the three studies.
The SSSS (Buttermore, James, & Kirkpatrick, 2003) was revised in an attempt to 
increase the reliability and validity of the status, dominance, and prestige subscales. The
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authors generated additional items, which were added to the 21-item scale used in Study 
1. Please see Table 6 for a list of the 40-items of the revised scale.
Results and Discussion 
I performed a principal-axes factor analysis on the 40 items from the SSSS. On 
the basis of eigenvalues and inspection of the scree plot, I examined both the three and 
four factor solutions, eventually settling on three primary factors of interest. Eigenvalues 
of the four factors were 9.17, 3.81, 2.51, and 1.69; the next highest eigenvalue was 1.54. 
Because status, dominance, and prestige have been shown to be significantly correlated in 
Study 1 (See Table 1), I examined the structure matrix for the three-factor oblimin 
rotation, which is shown in Table 6. The structure matrix for the four-factor oblimin 
rotation is shown in Table 7. Items 2, 22, 33, and 35 were eliminated because they loaded 
on more than one factor. Item 29 loaded on Factor 2 in the three factor solution, but did 
not load strongly on any factor in the four factor solution, so it was eliminated. Items 8, 
23, and 30 were eliminated because they loaded most strongly on Factor 4, which appears 
to be assessing reactions to public recognition. Henrich & Gil-White (2001) did not 
explain how reactions to praise should be differentially related to status, dominance, or 
prestige. Therefore, Factor 4 was not considered as a theoretically distinct factor.
Fourteen items loaded on the prestige scale, but there appeared to be redundancy 
in some of the items. Therefore, items 21, 24, 25, and 28 were eliminated in order to 
avoid repeating statements similar to those that were part of the earlier version of the 
prestige scale. Items 3, 7, 12, 14, 17, 20, 27, 37, 38, and 40 that loaded on Factor 1 
describe a person who has deference freely conferred upon him or her. Being respected 
and admired, having one’s opinion valued, being imitated, having high status, possessing
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expertise that is recognized by others, and offering unique talents and abilities are all 
characteristics ascribed to a prestigious person (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Cronbach’s 
alpha for the prestige scale was .89.
Items 6, 9, 16, 19, 32, 36, and 39 loaded most strongly on Factor 2. Items 13 and 
26 loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 4, and were selected for this subscale after the decision 
was made not to consider Factor 4 a theoretically distinct factor. Despite a split loading 
on Factor 1 and Factor 2, Item 31 was selected for this subscale when it was determined 
that adding it increased the reliability of the subscale. The 10 items that were selected for 
Factor 2 describe a tendency to rely upon displays of dominance as a strategy for gaining 
others’ compliance. Statements from this subscale involve using aggressive tactics to get 
one’s way, giving orders, having control over others, refusing to compromise, and 
fighting one’s way to the top. Factor 2 describes individuals who are willing to use force 
to sway others’ opinions. This factor has been labeled “dominance.” Cronbach’s alpha for 
the dominance scale was .81.
Items 1,5, 11, 15, 18, and 34 loaded most strongly on Factor 3. Item 10 loaded on 
Factor 1 and Factor 3, but was selected for Factor 3 because it loaded with that subscale 
in earlier studies (Buttermore, 2003). Item 4 was selected for Factor 4 despite a split 
loading when it was determined that adding it increased the reliability of the subscale. At 
first glance, Factor 3 appears to be the opposite of dominant behavior. The eight items 
loading on this factor seem to describe the prototypical “wuss,” a person who is 
submissive, compromising, and willing to let others walk all over him or her. The eight 
items that loaded on this factor included statements about doing favors to get on 
someone’s good side, deferring to others when decisions have to be made, trying to see
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what others think before taking a stand, letting others win arguments, and being easily 
intimidated by dominant individuals. However, by rewording the five previously 
mentioned items, we are reminded that a high status person is one who does not have to 
do favors to get on someone’s good side, is not expected to defer to others in decision­
making, takes a stand without first trying to see what others think, does not let others win 
arguments, and is not easily intimidated by dominant individuals. Factor 3 has therefore 
been tentatively labeled “status.” The status scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .75.
All eight of the items that loaded on the status scale are reverse-scored, suggesting 
that these items might be better conceptualized as a submissiveness factor than as a status 
factor. Some research into psychopathology has focused on the importance of treating 
submissiveness as a construct that is distinct from dominance (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; 
Gilbert & Allan, 1994). Correlational studies have revealed that high assertiveness 
(dominance) and submissiveness are not equivalent constructs. Hallmarks of submissive 
behavior such as fear of strangers and passivity are related to psychological disorders 
such as social anxiety and depression that are not strongly related to measures of 
dominance. These findings suggest that submissive and dominant behaviors are perhaps 
best conceptualized as two distinct dimensions rather than one bipolar dimension. Future 
research should attempt to clarify this relationship by validating the status subscale of the 
SSSS against an existing measure of submissive behavior, such as the Submissive 
Behavior Scale (Allan & Gilbert, 1997).
Study 2 was designed to increase the reliability of the three subscales of the Self- 
Perceived Social Status Scale. This goal was achieved for two of the three subscales. The 
alphas of the 10-item prestige and dominance subscales were found to be above .80,
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indicating that they are reliable measures. Treating each of the 3 factors from the status 
scale as a measure of a separate construct, I examined the correlations among the SE 
scales. As expected, the three subscales were significantly correlated with one another (ps 
< .001). Henrich and Gil-White believed that dominance and prestige were two distinct 
pathways to achieving status. Status was significantly correlated with both dominance (r 
= .21) and prestige (r = .42). Lending credence to the importance of the distinction 
between these two pathways is the relatively low correlation between dominance and 
prestige (r = .23). However, the alpha for the 8-item status scale is a little low at .75. The 
status subscale continues to be problematic. In terms of questionnaire design, it has been 
difficult to write and validate items that assess status without making a distinction as to 
the method used to obtain that status.
My failure to design a reliable status scale could also be due in part to the 
population in which the measures were administered. The College of William & Mary is 
a highly-selective public university, at which the students value academic success. In 
such an academic setting, it seems safe to assume that the most common pathway taken 
for achieving status is by prestigious means. Students seek to establish themselves 
through their talents and abilities rather than through strength or force. This fact is 
reinforced by the fact that the questionnaire item, “I have high status in my social groups” 
loaded on the prestige factor rather than the status factor. Participants in the present study 
appeared to think of the words status and prestige as synonyms. In fact, the highest 
correlation among the SSSS subscales was found between status and prestige (r = .42, p < 
.001). It is perhaps impractical to attempt to measure the construct of status 
independently. I will continue to work to improve the status scale, but I believe it is
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necessary to focus on the most important distinction as assessed by the much-improved 
prestige and dominance subscales.
STUDY 3
There were two major goals for Study 3. The first aim was to clarify the nature of 
participants’ emotional expressions in the private-expression condition. Leary et al. 
(1996) found that the levels of self-reported embarrassment reported in the private- 
expression condition fell midway between those reported in the public and no-expression 
conditions, but did not differ significantly from either of those two. Study 1 showed that 
the amount of embarrassment reported in the private condition was not significantly 
different from the amount of embarrassment reported in the public-expression condition, 
suggesting that recording one’s embarrassment on paper is just as effective at relieving 
discomfort as is sharing embarrassment with someone else. In Study 3, special effort was 
made to ensure that the participants’ responses in the private-expression condition 
remained completely anonymous. With these extra measures taken to ensure the privacy 
of participants’ responses, it was hypothesized that the results would support the 
conclusions drawn by Leary and colleagues. It was expected that participants in the 
public-expression condition would report significantly less embarrassment than those in 
either the private- or no-expression conditions who had no opportunity to share their 
emotions with someone else.
The second aim of the study was to reexamine the findings of Study 1, using the 
improved measures of status, dominance, and prestige, as revised in Study 2. As in Study 
1, hypotheses were made about the predictive powers of domain-specific SE, as well as
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the moderating effects of domain-specific SE on the effects described by Leary and 
colleagues (1996). Study 1 found that no domain of SE emerged as a significant predictor 
of embarrassment when entered into a regression equation with all the other domains, 
global SE, condition, and sex of participant. It was hypothesized that in the present study 
(a) if there was significant power for any domain to emerge as a significant predictor in 
this equation, that domain would be dominance, and (b) global SE would not emerge as a 
predictor of embarrassment when domain-specific SEs were included in the regression 
equation. In further support of the results from Study 1 concerning the interaction of 
dominance and condition, it was hypothesized that (a) dominant individuals would 
express lower levels of embarrassment than less dominant individuals after having the 
opportunity to share their embarrassment with the researcher, and (b) conveying 
embarrassment to others would have little impact on the embarrassment reported by less 
dominant individuals.
Method
Participants
Ninety-nine undergraduate students (49 males and 50 females) from the College 
of William and Mary participated in the study in partial fulfillment of an introductory 
psychology course requirement. One student withdrew from the study after being told she 
would be asked to complete a singing task. Six additional participants were eliminated 
from the sample because of experimenter error during the experimental session or due to 
failure on the part of the participant to follow directions. The most common problem with 
the experimental manipulation was participants who verbally expressed their 
embarrassment to the researcher despite being given instructions not to speak unless
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asked to by the experimenter. After exclusions, the total sample size was N=  92 (46 
males and 47 females). The experimental sessions were conducted by three male and two 
female experimenters.
Procedure and Materials
Participants completed the same three portions of the study as in Study 1: 
personality measures, singing task, and follow-up questionnaire. The materials and 
procedure used in Study 3 were virtually identical to those used in Study 1, with two 
exceptions. First, the new, more reliable status, prestige, and dominance subscales of the 
Self-Perceived Social Status Scale were administered to the participants. All 40 items 
from the SSSS, as revised in Study 2 were included in the study materials (Table 5). The 
three subscales were created with the items as selected by the factor analyses in Study 2. 
The 10-item prestige scale had an alpha of .82, the 10-item dominance scale had an alpha 
of .76, and the 8 -item status scale had an alpha of .75.
In order to address possible problems with the private-expression condition in 
Study 1 ,1 attempted to create a situation in which participants would believe that their 
answers to the initial questionnaire remained completely anonymous. Rather than placing 
their completed questionnaires into an envelope, as in Study 1, participants in the private- 
expression condition were instructed by the researcher before he or she left the room to 
fold their answers to the initial questionnaire and to place those folded answers into a 
sealed box so that their “answers remained anonymous.” Participants were then instructed 
to crack to the door to let the researcher know that he or she could return to the room.
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks & Preliminary Analyses
Two participants gave incorrect answers on the manipulation check items. Both of 
these participants were in the private-expression condition and incorrectly answered that 
they had not completed a questionnaire asking about their feelings during the singing 
task. As stated in Study 1, these errors can probably be attributed to the confusing nature 
of the manipulation check questions, rather than to problems in the methodology. The 
responses of these two participants were removed from the sample, leaving a sample size 
of N  = 90 (45 men and 45 women).
Each of the three factors of the status scale was treated as a measure of a separate 
domain of SE. The correlations among the SE scales are shown in Table 8 . Of the 
measures of domain-specific SE, only dominance was not significantly positively 
correlated with global SE. The correlations were similar among males and females, with 
one exception. Among females, dominance was significantly positively correlated with 
status (r = .40,/? < .01), prestige (r = .39,p  < .01), and mate value (r = .39,/? < .01), but 
among males, none of those correlation was significant (rs < .28).
Reexamining the Differences among the Public-, Private-, and No-Expression Conditions 
As in Study 1, a principal components factor analysis of the seven items of the 
follow-up questionnaire was conducted to ensure that the five embarrassment items 
formed one factor. Based on eigenvalues of 3.69 and 1.02, two factors were retained. 
Using an oblimin rotation, all five embarrassment items showed high loadings (> .67) on 
the first factor. Of the two non-embarrassment items, depressed showed a high loading 
on the second factor (.93). However, hostile loaded evenly on both factors (.44 on Factor
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1 and .46 on Factor 2). Because this item failed to load uniquely on one factor, it was not 
included in the analysis of the embarrassment items. The five embarrassment items were 
summed to yield a measure of self-reported embarrassment. Alpha for the five items on 
the follow-up questionnaire meant to assess self-reported embarrassment was .8 8 .
A 2 (sex) x 3 (condition) analysis of variance was conducted on the self-reported 
embarrassment scores. There was no main effect of sex, F(l,89) = 3.53,/? > .05, and the 
interaction of sex and condition was not significant (F < 1), indicating that males and 
females did not differ significantly in the amount of embarrassment they reported. The 
mean sums of self-reported embarrassment for the Leary et al. (1996) study, Study 1, and 
Study 3 are displayed in Table 9. As in the previous studies, a series of planned contrasts 
was conducted. In order to most accurately test the prediction that individuals who have 
had the opportunity to publicly express their embarrassment should subsequently report 
less embarrassment than those whose embarrassment remains private, the embarrassment 
scores of those in the public-expression condition were compared to the scores of 
participants in the private- and no-expression conditions whose feelings remained 
unknown to the researcher (contrast coefficients = -2, +1, +1). The results of this test 
were not reported by Leary and colleagues, but as in Study 1, the results were not 
significant, F(l,87) = 1.33,p  > .05. Next, participants in the public-expression condition 
whose feelings were known by the researcher were compared to participants in the no­
expression condition whose feelings were unknown to the researcher (contrast 
coefficients = -1, 0, +1). Consistent with the findings of Leary and colleagues and Study 
1 , participants who did not have the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to the
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researcher reported being more embarrassed than participants whose feelings were known 
to the researcher, F ( l ,8 8 ) = 4.58, p  < .05.
As suggested by the pattern of results shown in Table 9, an additional planned 
contrast (contrast coefficients = 0 , - 1 , + 1) demonstrated that the embarrassment scores in 
the private-expression condition were significantly different from the scores in the no­
expression condition, F ( l ,8 8 ) = 5.21 >P< .05. This replicates the findings of Study 1 and 
differs from the finding of Leary et al. (1996) that the private-expression condition 
differed from neither the public- nor the no-expression conditions. A final contrast 
(contrast coefficients = - 1 , + 1 , 0 ) showed that the private-expression condition did not 
differ from the public-expression condition, F ( l ,8 8 ) = .02,p  > .05. This last result also 
mirrors the results found in Study 1 and the Leary et al. (1996) study. In Study 3, as in 
Study 1, the mean embarrassment scores in the public and private-expression conditions 
look virtually identical.
Domain-Specific Self-Esteem and the Expression o f  Embarrassment
As in Study 1, the second major goal of Study 3 was to test whether specific 
domains of self-esteem were more predictive of embarrassment than was global SE. In 
order to accomplish this, the four domain-specific SE scales, global SE, condition, and 
sex (males = -1 and females = + 1) were entered into a regression equation predicting 
embarrassment on the final questionnaire. Two orthogonal contrasts were entered into 
each regression equation to account for the condition variable: Condition Contrast 1 
(contrast coefficients = +2, -1,-1) and Condition Contrast 2 (contrast coefficients = 0, +1, 
-1). The regression coefficients for each variable are presented in Table 10. As in Study 
1, Condition Contrast 2 emerged as a significant predictor (P = -.21 .05). However,
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the improved measure of status did emerge as a significant predictor of embarrassment (P 
= -.37, p  < .01), as did global SE (p = -.29,p  < .05). This analysis offered no support for 
the hypothesis that domain-specific SEs would be better predictors of embarrassment 
than global SE. Recall that in the present study it was hypothesized, based on the findings 
from Study 1, that if any domain emerged as a predictor of embarrassment, that domain 
would be dominance. Instead, as was hypothesized in Study 1, status emerged as a 
significant inverse predictor. This finding makes sense in light of previous correlational 
studies that found a similar inverse relationship between status and embarrassment 
(Buttermore, 2003).
From the standpoint of Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (2001) theory of domain-specific 
SE, it is somewhat troubling that global SE remained a significant predictor of 
embarrassment in this multiple regression. It is possible that the strength of global SE as a 
predictor despite the inclusion of several domain-specific SEs in the regression equation 
is due to another domain of SE that has not been explicitly measured in our model. 
Perhaps if domains such as social inclusion, between- or within-group competition, or 
morality had been explicitly measured as part of the current study, this effect of global SE 
would disappear. In order to further explore the predictive power of global SE and status,
I studied the moderating effect of each type of SE in an individual regression equation. 
Domain-specific Self-esteems as Moderators o f  the Leary et al. (1996) Findings
As in Study 1, each of the domain-specific SE scales was mean-centered and 
entered individually into a regression equation containing the scale scores from the other 
domain-specific SE measures, as well as contrast-coded variables representing condition, 
sex, the interaction of sex and the domain of SE, and the interaction of condition and the
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domain of SE. Two orthogonal contrasts were entered into each regression equation to 
account for the condition variable: Condition Contrast 1 (contrast coefficients = +2, -1,
-1) and Condition Contrast 2 (contrast coefficients = 0, +1, -1). As explained in Study 1, 
the interaction of Condition Contrast 1 and each of the mean-centered domains of SE 
assesses the degree to which individuals’ SE in that domain is related to the relief they 
felt after having the opportunity to convey their embarrassment to others.
For each of the multiple regression equations, the only significant predictors to 
emerge were Condition Contrast 2, status, and global SE. Table 11 presents the results 
from the multiple regression including the dominance interaction terms, which was the 
regression equation of primary interest in Study 1. The pattern of results found in Study 1 
differs greatly from the pattern found in this study. As previously revealed by the planned 
contrasts, the significance of Condition 2 as a predictor in the multiple regression 
equations indicated that the private-expression condition differed significantly from the 
no-expression condition. However, these results fail to replicate the results from Study 1 
that the interaction of dominance and condition was a significant predictor of 
embarrassment, with highly dominant individuals reporting more embarrassment in the 
private- and no-expression conditions and less embarrassment after having a chance to 
share their emotions in the public-expression condition. The Dominance * Condition 
Contrast 1 interaction failed to even approach significance (p = .10,/? = .33) in Study 3, 
whereas the effect in Study 1 was quite strong (p = -.56 ,p  < .01). As shown in Figure 2, 
though not significant, the pattern of results for the Dominance x Condition Contrast 1 
interaction in Study 3 is in the opposite direction as the pattern found in Study 1.
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There are several possible reasons for the failure of Study 3 to replicate Study 1. 
First, it is important to note that the status, dominance, and prestige scales were altered 
from Study 1 to Study 3. It is certainly possible that the changes in the patterns of results 
are due to the changes in the predictor variables. However, the revised scales used in 
Study 3 contained all of the items comprising the three subscales in Study 1, making it 
possible to do a reanalysis of the data from Study 3 using the less reliable versions of the 
scales as was done in Study 1. This approach revealed findings virtually identical to the 
findings using the revised version. In other words, the pattern of results in Study 3 looks 
the same regardless of whether the old or new versions of the status, dominance, and 
prestige subscales were used.
Another potential problem with the experiment comes from anecdotal evidence as 
reported by the five experimenters involved in data collection. Upon entering the lab, 
several participants asked questions such as, “Is this the study where I have to sing?” 
Study 3 was conducted during the spring semester immediately following the semester 
during which Study 1 was conducted. It appears that some of the students who were 
involved in Study 1 shared information about the experimental manipulation with 
students who later participated in Study 3. Although attempts were made by the 
experimenters to make note of those students who knew about the study prior to their 
participation and subsequently remove the tainted data, there is no way of knowing 
whether all students who were aware of the experimental task were excluded from the 
study. Consequently, there is no way to test whether those with prior knowledge differed 
significantly from naive participants in their reactions to the embarrassing task.
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The finding that it was the status scale, rather than the dominance scale, that 
moderated the condition effects as reported by Leary and colleagues (1996) is perhaps 
not as close to a complete failure to replicate Study 1 as it may at first seem. As discussed 
at the end of Study 2, it is possible that the revised status scale is actually a measure of 
submissiveness, rather than a measure of status. It has been argued that submissiveness 
and dominance do not represent opposite ends of the same continuum, but the two 
constructs are certainly more closely related to each other than is either to prestige. If the 
status subscale does represent a measure of submissiveness, it is important to note that in 
both Study 1 and Study 3, it was dominance and submissiveness, rather than prestige, that 
were related to embarrassment.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
With these three studies, I attempted to address three research questions. I found 
some support for the conclusions drawn from the Leary et al. (1996) study, that 
participants who had a prior opportunity to express their embarrassment to the researcher 
reported less embarrassment than those whose embarrassment remained private. 
However, some question remains as to whether Leary and colleagues tested the 
hypothesis most appropriate for their intended research question. Second, I found mixed 
support for the idea that domain-specific self-esteems are better predictors of the reaction 
to an embarrassing situation than is global SE. Finally, I found some support for the 
hypothesis that domain-specific SE moderates the effect reported by Leary and 
colleagues, but it remains unclear whether dominance is the most important predictor. 
Replication o f  the Leary et al. (1996) Study
I failed in both Study 1 and Study 3 to replicate the finding from the Leary et al. 
(1996) study that those participants in the private-expression condition reported levels of 
embarrassment between the high levels reported by those in the no-expression condition 
and the low levels reported in the public-expression condition, but did not differ 
significantly from either condition. In both Study 1 and Study 3 ,1 found that participants 
reported levels of embarrassment that were virtually equivalent to the levels reported in 
the public-expression condition. These two studies showed that participants who had the 
chance to either share their embarrassment with the researcher or had the opportunity to
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record their feelings on paper reported significantly less embarrassment than those who 
did not have any opportunity to express their feelings.
I attempted to address the failure to replicate Leary and colleagues’ (1996) 
findings in Study 1 by improving the private-expression condition in the Study 3. As part 
of the latter study, every effort was made to ensure that participants in the private- 
expression condition were aware that the researchers had no way of matching their 
responses on the initial questionnaire to the participants’ responses on the final 
questionnaires. However, further examination of the mean embarrassment scores reported 
in each condition in the three studies suggests that the differences between the Leary et 
al. study and the present two studies could lie in the public-expression condition (Table 
9). Leary et al. reported a mean embarrassment score on the public-expression condition 
of M =  18.9, whereas the means in the same condition in Studies 1 and 3 were higher at 
M=  24.7 and M =  27.5 respectively. The range of these mean scores (8 .6 ) is larger than 
the ranges between the three studies in both the private- (3.6) and no- (4.3) expression 
conditions. In other words, participants in the Leary et al. study reported being less 
embarrassed after having the opportunity to share their feelings with the researcher than 
did participants in the present two studies. In fact, participants in Study 1 and Study 3 
here were no less embarrassed after the researcher examined their answers to the initial 
questionnaire than were participants whose responses were not examined by the 
researcher.
These results therefore offer only limited support for the theory that individuals 
are motivated to convey their embarrassment to others as a way to decrease their 
discomfort. Rather, they seem to suggest that publicly expressing embarrassment offers
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no more relief than simply recording embarrassment in writing. Pennebaker (1990) has 
conducted many studies which investigate the effect of narrative writing on physical 
well-being. His work has consistently demonstrated that individuals who document their 
aversive experiences suffer fewer long-term psychological hardships as a result of those 
events. While offering support for the idea that writing about negative feelings helps to 
relieve discomfort, this research is only tangentially related to the present studies. 
Pennebaker’s work examines diary-like writing that requires in-depth processing of the 
emotions, whereas participants in the present study merely rated their emotions inasmuch 
as they were summed up by five adjectives. Nonetheless, the present studies suggest that 
even quickly considering the nature of the current emotional state can serve to alleviate 
emotional discomfort.
It is also possible that the nature of the public-expression condition might have 
caused participants in that condition to feel violated, rather than relieved, when the 
experimenter examined their responses. If the participants assumed that their responses to 
the initial questionnaire would remain anonymous, they would undoubtedly have been 
shocked when the researcher examined their responses. Perhaps this contributed to the 
participants’ negative emotional states, and prevented any relief that could have come as 
a result of the public disclosure. As a post hoc test of this explanation, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted for each of the two studies, with condition predicting calmness 
(Item 7 on the final questionnaire). In Study 1, there was an effect of condition, F(2, 8 8 )
= 4.01 ,p  < .05, such that participants in the public (M = 7.43) and private (M= 1.21) 
expression conditions reported feeling calmer than participants in the no-expression 
condition (.M=  5.68). The same was true for Study 3, F(2, 87) = 2.51,p  < .05.
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Participants in the public (M=  7.27) and private (M=  7.00) expression conditions felt 
calmer than participants in the no-expression condition (M =  5.57). Thus, it appears that 
having one’s responses examined by an experimenter did not increase negative arousal.
In support of Pennebaker (1990), simply recording information about a negative 
emotional experience appeared to have a calming effect.
The Predictive Power o f Domain-Specific SE
The results of Study 1 supported the prediction that domain-specific self-esteems 
would predict the tendency to express the emotions to others. It was found that more 
dominant individuals reported significantly less embarrassment after being given a prior 
opportunity to convey their feelings publicly than did less dominant individuals. In fact, 
more dominant individuals mirrored the pattern found by Leary et al. (1996), in which 
publicly conveying embarrassment led to significantly less embarrassment than either 
writing about that embarrassment or having no opportunity to express one’s feelings. 
Among less dominant individuals, being given a chance to publicly express the emotions 
did far less to relieve embarrassment. There was little difference between the means in 
the public and private/no-expression conditions, suggesting that less dominant individuals 
continued to be embarrassed even after being given a chance to share their emotions with 
the experimenter.
However, the results of Study 3 are very different from the results of Study 1, 
despite the fact that Study 3 was designed as a replication. In Study 3, dominance was n o t. 
a significant predictor of embarrassment, and the Dominance x Condition interaction was 
not significant. The only self-esteem variables that emerged as significant predictors of 
embarrassment were status and global self-esteem. Judging by the number of participants
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who had prior knowledge of the experimental manipulation coming into Study 3, it seems 
probable that the results of the second study should be called, into question, and an 
additional attempt should be made to replicate the dominance effects found in Study 1.
Dominant individuals, who use force to attain status, need to be more concerned 
than prestigious individuals about the ramifications of embarrassment-inducing actions. 
Whereas prestigious individuals can remain secure in the knowledge that their social 
inclusion, which comes as a result of their unique skills and talents, is not threatened by a 
minor social offense such as singing badly, dominant individuals must be concerned 
about any and all threats to their social standing. Furthermore, the significant drop seen in 
the levels of embarrassment reported by dominant individuals once their feelings, as 
reported in the initial questionnaire, were observed by the researcher, could be an attempt 
at damage control. If the individual reported high levels of embarrassment in the initial 
questionnaire, but never expected those levels to be viewed by the researcher, the lower 
embarrassment ratings in the public-expression condition could be seen as the dominant 
individual’s attempt to say, “I wasn’t really as negatively affected by this singing task as 
you might think based on my previous answers.” Perhaps in the eyes of a highly 
dominant individual, the best strategy for ensuring that a weakness is not exploited, is to 
deny that the weakness ever existed.
Limitations and Future Directions
These three studies have several notable weaknesses that must be addressed in 
any attempt to understand their implications. Studies 1 and 3 relied on several new 
measures of domain-specific SE and their predictive value. Study 2 demonstrated that 
both the dominance and prestige subscales of the SSSS are reliable measures, but the
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status scale was not as reliable. All three of these subscales need to be validated against 
other related scales. It is especially important to test whether the status subscale is 
actually assessing status, or whether makes better theoretical sense to think of the scale as 
measuring submissiveness.
As originally designed by Leary and colleagues (1996), this methodology was 
meant to investigate whether individuals who have done something embarrassing are 
motivated to share their emotions with others. However, the word motivation seems a bit 
misleading when applied to the procedure used in these studies. Participants had no 
choice as to the strategy they used following an embarrassing predicament. In the public- 
expression condition, the researcher examined the participants’ responses to the initial 
questionnaire, whereas in the private-expression condition, the participants were 
instructed to write down their feelings, but not to communicate them to the researcher. 
This is more a controlled study of individuals’ reactions to having their feelings 
examined by an observer, rather than of a participant’s motivation to share those feelings. 
Future studies should investigate whether or not participants choose to convey their 
emotions to the researcher in this setting, and if so, how they choose to do so. Many of 
the participants who were eliminated from the study were excluded because they made 
jokes about their singing, or took some other measure to communicate their discomfort. 
Choosing to use such a strategy to share embarrassment would probably also be closely 
tied to the domains of status, dominance, and prestige.
These studies looked at only one type of verbal remedial strategy, expressing 
embarrassment to someone else. Future research could investigate how other remedial 
strategies influence the subjective experience of embarrassment. For example, Study 2 of
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the Leary et al. (1996) article investigated how individuals reacted to having their levels 
of facial flushing noticed by the researcher. If, as proposed by Leary and Meadows 
(1991), blushing is an involuntary response indicating humility, which is meant to 
mitigate potential negative evaluations of the blusher by others and to ensure that the 
individual remains socially included, then it seems likely that differences in dominance 
and prestige would be related to blushing. As shown in the studies by Sueda and 
Wiseman (1992) and Fink and Walker (1977) individuals use different remedial 
strategies such as humor and apologizing, depending on their social status in an 
interaction. It would be interesting to test whether high- and low-status, dominance, or 
prestige, individuals differ in their preferred remedial strategy.
The present studies investigated how public displays of embarrassment influence 
the feelings and behaviors of the person who had completed an embarrassing task. In 
future studies it would be interesting to study how the same behaviors influence the 
observer of the social transgression. For example, observers of embarrassing actions 
might react more or less favorably to individuals who demonstrate verbal or nonverbal 
displays of their feelings, based on the transgressors social status. Perhaps the so-called 
motivation to convey embarrassment to others is a misguided strategy. It could be that it 
takes more than a confession to convince an onlooker that an embarrassing event need 
not reflect negatively on the offending party.
It appears that privately recording feelings of embarrassment does help to 
decrease discomfort, but it remains unclear whether sharing these feelings with others is 
an equally effective or (as suggested by Leary and colleagues) more effective strategy for 
lessening that discomfort. However, the results of Study 1 suggest that those high and
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low in dominance differ in their reactions to having their feelings publicly 
communicated. Whereas those high in dominance expressed less embarrassment after 
their feelings were revealed to the researcher than they did if their feelings remained 
private, those low in dominance reported similar levels of embarrassment whether their 
feelings remained public or private. This finding suggests that an understanding of 
domain-specific SE is important for predicting the expression of emotion following an 
embarrassing event.
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TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS AMONG SELF-ESTEEM SCALES (STUDY 1)
SE scale 1 2 3 4
1. Global SE -
2. Status 4 9 * * -
3. Dominance .13 .35** -
4. Prestige .50** .26* .13 -
5. Mate Value .43** .18 .17 .48**
*p  < .05. ** p  < .01
62
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF SELF-REPORTED EMBARRASSMENT SCORES 
FROM LEARY ET AL. (1996) AND STUDY 1
Expression of Embarrassment
Public Private None
Leary et al. (1996) 18.9 23.5 29.8
Buttermore -  Study 1 24.7 23.0 35.6
Note. Numbers reflect the sum of ratings on five items: embarrassed, nervous, foolish, 
calm (reverse scored), and self-conscious.
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TABLE 3
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING EMBARRASSMENT 
FROM DOMAIN-SPECIFIC SE (STUDY 1)
Variable B SE B P
Dominance -2.30 1.58 -.16
Prestige -2.35 2.69 - . 1 0
Status -1.38 1.76 -.09
Mate Value -1.73 1.47 -.14
Global SE 1.82 2.35 .1 0
Sex -0 .2 1 1.35 - . 0 2
Condition 1 (+2, -1, -1) -1.77 0.98 -.18
Condition 2 (0, +1, -1) -6.65 1.66 40* * *
Note. N=  91.
*** p  < .001.
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TABLE 4
RESULTS FOR INTERACTION TERMS FROM SEPARATE 
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS (STUDY 1)
Interaction Term B SE B P
Global SE x Condition 0.67 1.40 .05
Status x Condition -1.31 1.16 - . 1 2
Dominance x Condition -3.47 1.24 -.30**
Prestige x Condition 2.59 1.79 .15
Mate value x Condition 1.54 0.94 .18
Note. N =  91. Each row represents a separate multiple regression in which the interaction
of one domain of SE and effects-coded condition (+2, -1,-1) was tested with the effects 
of sex, condition, and each additional domain of SE controlled.
**p  < .0 1 .
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TABLE 5
RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING 
EMBARRASSMENT (STUDY 1)
Variable B SE B P
Dominance -3.43 1.60 -.23*
Condition 1 (+2, -1,-1) -1.83 0.96 -.19
Condition 2 (0, +1, -1) -6.34 1.63 - 38***
Dominance x Condition 1 -3.47 1.24 -.30**
Dominance x Condition 2 0.32 1.67 . 0 2
Status -1.87 1.74 - . 1 2
Prestige - 1 .8 8 2 . 6 8 -.08
Mate Value -2.51 1.49 - . 2 0
Global SE 1.67 2.37 . 1 0
Sex 0.41 1.35 .03
Sex x Condition 1 1.26 1 .0 1 .13
Sex x Condition 2 0 .1 1 1.63 .01
Note. A =91.
* p  < .05. ** /?< . 01. * * * p <  .001.
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TABLE 6
THREE FACTOR OBLIMIN ROTATION OF SSSS SUBSCALES (STUDY 2)
Item 1 2 3
1. I sometimes do favors for people to get on their .05 .16 .49good side. (R)*
2 . I tend to dominate social situations.* .49 .57 -.18
3. Members of my peer group respect and admire me.* .73 .06 - .2 1
4. Others believe they can push me around. (R) -.41 -.28 .61
5. I defer to others when decisions have to be made. (R)* -.26 -.36 .48
6. I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.* .08 .63 -.08
7. Others do not value my opinion. (R)* -.60 - . 0 2 .35
8 . People often 'let it slide' when I fail to meet my -.07 . 1 0 .37obligations.
9. I enjoy having control over others.* .14 .66 . 2 0
10. I feel inferior to members of my peer group. (R)* -.61 -.07 .56
11. I must admit that I try to see what others think - . 1 0 -.13 .62before I take a stand. (R)*
12. Others recognize me for my contributions to my social groups. .65 .18 -.09
13. I do not like to give orders. (R)* -.28 -.59 .23
14. Members of my peer group do not want to be like__  /n\j. -.57 -.07 . 2 0
15. It is pretty easy for people to win arguments with me. (R)* -.35 -.29
6
.50
16. I don't mind compromising with other people. (R)* - .0 1 -.43 .09
17. I have high status in my social groups.* .77 .26 -.23
18. I am easily intimidated by dominant individuals. (R)* -.39 -.32 .64
19. Others know it is better to let me have my way. . 2 2 .62 . 1 0
20. There are some matters on which I am considered an expert by others.* .47 . 2 2 .14
2 1 . I have high rank in my social groups. .78 .29 - .2 1
2 2 . I demand respect from members of my peer group.* .55 .39 -.13
23. It makes me uncomfortable when others publicly praise me. - .1 1 -.09 .14
24. Other find my advice helpful. .57 . 0 2 -.15
25. I have access to resources that others do not. .40 .16 .17
26. I do not enjoy having authority over other people.
(R)
-.19 -.53 .05
27. My unique talents and abilities are recognized by others. .72 - .0 1 -.08
28. Others do not second guess my choices. .44 .04 - .1 1
29. I do not mind taking orders or being told what to do.
(R)
-.06 -.36 .13
30. When I am being introduced, I don't like the person to make lengthy comments about what I have done. - . 1 0 -.16 .15
31. My opinions hold greater weight relative to others' in my social group. .51 .40 -.03
32. I try to control others rather than permit them to control me. .28 .75 .01
33. I don't have a forceful or dominant personality. (R) -.29 -.61 .37
34. If I have done something well, I make sure I call it to other people’s attention. (R) .08 .25
6
.47
35. People seem naturally to turn to me when decisions have to be made. .58 .35 -.32
36. I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want. .08 .64 .20
37. I have gained distinction and social prestige among my peers. .79 .25 -.11
38. I am held in high esteem by those I know. .82 .10 -.19
39. I believe I have to fight my way to the top.* -.04 .45 .18
40. Others consider what I will think before making choices. .58 .22 -.06
Note. The 28 items that were selected as being the best items for the three subscales are 
presented in bold. The bolded factor loading indicates the subscale to which those 
respective items belong.
* Indicates items from the earlier versions of the SSSS subscales.
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TABLE 7
FOUR FACTOR OBLIMIN ROTATION OF SSSS SUBSCALES (STUDY 2)
Item 1 2 3 4
1. I sometimes do favors for people to get on their good side. (R)* .05 .2 1 .47 .09
2 . I tend to dominate social situations.* .49 .55 - . 2 0 -.13
3. Members of my peer group respect and admire me.* .73 . 0 2 -.17 -.15
4. Others believe they can push me around.
(R)
-.41 - .2 1 .59 .23
5. I defer to others when decisions have to be made. (R)* -.27 -.32 .50 . 1 2
6. I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.* .08 .61 - .1 1 -.14
7. Others do not value my opinion. (R)* -.60 .03 .31 .19
8 . People often 'let it slide' when I fail to meet my obligations. -.07 .18 .29 .39
9. I enjoy having control over others.* .13 .64 . 2 0 -.27
10. I feel inferior to members of my peer group.
(R>*
-.61 . 0 0 .52 . 2 0
11. I must admit that I try to see what others think before I take a stand. (R)* - .1 1 - . 1 0 .65 -.05
12. Others recognize me for my contributions to my social groups. .65 .14 -.04 -.25
13. I do not like to give orders. (R)* -.27 -.53 .2 0 .45
14. Members of my peer group do not want to be like me. (R)* -.57 -.04 .17 . 1 2
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15. It is pretty easy for people to win arguments with me. (R)* -.35 -.24 .49 .20
16. I don't mind compromising with other people. (R)* -.01 -.45 .15 -.13
17. I have high status in my social groups.* .77 .24 -.23 -.04
18. I am easily intimidated by dominant individuals. (R)* -.39 -.26 .64 .17
19. Others know it is better to let me have my way. .22 .64 .04 .06
2 0 . There are some matters on which I am considered an expert by others.* .47 .22 .15 -.07
2 1 . I have high rank in my social groups. .78 .26 -.21 -.06
22. I demand respect from members of my peer group.* .55 .36 -.11 -.18
23. It makes me uncomfortable when others publicly praise me. -.10 -.01 .02 .64
24. Other find my advice helpful. .57 -.03 -.09 -.27
25. I have access to resources that others do not. .39 .15 .20 -.17
26. I do not enjoy having authority over other people. (R) -.18 -.46 -.01 .54
27. My unique talents and abilities are recognized by others. .72 -.04 -.03 -.17
28. Others do not second guess my choices. .44 .04 -.11 .05
29. I do not mind taking orders or being told what to do. (R) -.07 -.39 .22 -.27
30.
When I am being introduced, I don't like the 
person to make lengthy comments about what I 
have done.
-.09 -.09 .06 .54
31. My opinions hold greater weight relative to others' in my social group. .52 .43 -.09 .21
1 .
32. I try to control others rather than permit them to control me. .28 .75 -.04 -.06
33. I don't have a forceful or dominant -.29 -.56 .38 .20personality. (R)
34. If I have done something well, I make sure I call it to other people's attention. (R) .07 .27 .48 -.11
35. People seem naturally to turn to me when decisions have to be made. .59 .32 -.33 -.08
36. I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want. .08 .67 .14 .05
37. I have gained distinction and social prestige among my peers. .79 .23 -.11 -.04
38. I am held in high esteem by those I know. .82 .07 -.17 -.05
39. I believe I have to fight my way to the top.* -.04 .47 .14 .01
40. Others consider what I will think before .59 .21 -.05 -.07making choices.
Note. The 28 items that were selected as being the best items for the three subscales are 
presented in bold. The bolded factor loading indicates the subscale to which those 
respective items belong.
* Indicates items from the earlier versions of the SSSS subscales.
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TABLE 8
CORRELATIONS AMONG SELF-ESTEEM SCALES (STUDY 3)
SE scale 1 2 3 4
1. Global SE -
2. Status 3 7 ** -
3. Dominance .08 3 4 ** -
4. Prestige 4 7 ** .36** 32** -
5. Mate Value 4 9 ** 4 9 ** .23* .51**
*p  < .05. **p  < .01
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TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF SELF-REPORTED EMBARRASSMENT SCORES 
FROM LEARY ET AL. (1996) AND STUDIES 1 & 3
Expression of Embarrassment
Public Private None
Leary et al. (1996) 18.9 23.5 29.8
Buttermore -  Study 1 24.7 23.0 35.6
Buttermore -  Study 3 27.5 27.1 34.1
Note. Numbers reflect the sum of ratings on five items: embarrassed, nervous, foolish, 
calm (reverse scored), and self-conscious.
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TABLE 10
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING EMBARRASSMENT 
FROM DOMAIN-SPECIFIC SE (STUDY 3)
Variable B SE B (3
Dominance 1.51 1.75 .09
Prestige 0.97 2.46 .05
Status -5.74 1.79 _ 3 7 **
Mate Value 1.38 1.33 .13
Global SE -4.62 1.83 -.29*
Sex -1.99 1 . 1 2 -.16
Condition 1 (+2, -1,-1) -0.44 0 . 8 6 -.05
Condition 2 (0, +1, -1) -3.13 1.41 -.2 1 *
Note. N=  91.
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
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TABLE 11
RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION PREDICTING 
EMBARRASSMENT (STUDY 3)
Variable B SE B P
Dominance 1.83 1.81 .11
Condition 1 (+2, -1,-1) -0.27 0.89 -.03
Condition 2 (0, +1, -1) -3.20 1.45 -.22*
Dominance x Condition 1 1.22 1.26 .10
Dominance x Condition 2 1.28 1.80 .07
Status -5.89 1.86 -.38**
Prestige 1.11 2.53 .05
Mate Value 1.61 1.37 .15
Global SE -4.88 1.91 -.31*
Sex -1.96 1.15 -.16
Sex x Condition 1 .02 .82 .00
Sex x Condition 2 .39 1.45 .03
Note. N=  91.
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
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FIGURE 1
EMBARRASSMENT SCORES AS A FUNCTION OF 
CONDITION AND DOMINANCE (STUDY 1)
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FIGURE 2
EMBARRASSMENT SCORES AS A FUNCTION OF 
CONDITION AND DOMINANCE (STUDY 3)
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APPENDIX A
VERBATIM SCRIPT
Hi. My name is [Nicole Buttermore/ other researcher] and I am collecting data for a masters 
thesis project. I need your help to complete a study of the effect of music on emotion that will 
take approximately 30 minutes.
You will complete several questionnaires, then follow an instructional audiotape. Your responses 
to the audiotape will be recorded, but your name will not be associated with the recording. Next, 
you will fill out a few more questionnaires in which you will be asked about your reactions to the 
audiotape. I will explain the study more fully afterward and you can obtain the final results if you 
wish. I would like to take this time to assure you that your answers will be completely anonymous 
and that you may terminate your participation at any time. Also, please do not write your name or 
any other identifying information on any of the questionnaires.
OK, if you are willing to participate, please read the following consent form (Appendix B). This 
form indicates that I have explained this all to you and that you are willing to participate. Please 
sign the blank line and print your name below your signature so I can be sure you get credit for 
being here. I’ll be back in just a moment.
[Experimenter leaves to give participant a minute to review consent form. Experimenter returns.]
Thanks. [Collect consent form.] Here are several questionnaires. [Pass out Appendix C, D, & E.] 
Please go through them fairly quickly, then flip your answers over on the desk and crack the door 
to let me know you are finished. Then sit quietly until I come back. Don’t stop to think about any 
one question too long — your first impressions and immediate reactions are what we want. Do 
you have any questions? {Answer questions, if  any.] Just crack the door when you are done, OK?
[.Participant completes questionnaire and cracks door.]
Okay. Please leave your questionnaires on the desk and follow me into the next room. Please 
have a seat. I will now start the instructional audiotape and recording device. When instructed to 
do so, please pick up the microphone and project your voice into it. I’m going to remain in the 
room to make sure everything works smoothly, but please do not say anything to me unless I ask 
you to. Do you have any questions?
{Experimenter remains in room while participant follows the taped instructions.]
Public expression condition:
Please open folder # 2 and complete that questionnaire. When you are done, please crack 
the door to let me know you are finished. [Participant completes Appendix F]. 
Experimenter picks up and examines responses.] I’m going to take a quick look to see 
how you felt during the task.
79
Private expression condition:
Please open folder #2 and complete that questionnaire. When you are finished please fold 
your answers and place them into this [envelope/sealed box], so that your answers remain 
anonymous. Then crack the door to let me know you are finished. [Participant completes 
Appendix F.]
No expression condition".
[Participant does not fill out Appendix F. ]
Now, please complete this final questionnaire. [Give Appendix G.] Please note that I will be 
examining your responses once you have finished. Again, please crack the door when you are 
finished.
[Participant completes questionnaire.]
Public and Private expression conditions:
Now I just have two quick follow-up questions for you.
1. Following the singing task, were you asked to fill out a questionnaire that 
asked you about how that musical exercise made you feel?
2. Did I look at your answers to that questionnaire?
Thanks so much! Those last questions weren’t meant to confuse you. They were just a 
manipulation check. In case you are curious, here is what the study is about. I am interested in 
the way people react to embarrassing situations. This is a replication of a study done several years 
ago, in which people completed a singing task just like the one you did. Some people were then 
given the opportunity to express their embarrassment to the researcher, whereas others were not. 
The study found that people who were given the opportunity to express their embarrassment 
subsequently expressed less embarrassment than did those people who thought the researcher was 
unaware of their feelings. This finding suggests that people convey their embarrassment to others 
as a way of repairing their social image and decreasing their own levels of embarrassment. 
However, I believe that this effect may be different among individuals of high versus low status. 
Status is just one of several types of domain-specific self-esteem that may influence how people 
react to embarrassing situations. The questionnaire you completed at the beginning of the study 
included several different measures of different kinds of self-esteem, and I am going to look at 
the data to see which kinds are related to your subsequent feelings of embarrassment.
You should know that I did record your singing, but the tape will be erased. No one will ever hear 
the recording. That was only a way to induce immediate feelings of embarrassment.
If you are interested in the results of the study, feel free to send an email to [me /  Nicole 
Buttermore]. [My email /  her email address] is available on the experimetrix website as the 
contact person for this experiment, or it’s very easy to remember: nrbutt@wm.edu.
Finally, I’d like to ask you not to say anything about this study to anyone else who might be a 
participant in the future, as we will be collecting data for the next few weeks. Again, thanks very 
much for helping me out.
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APPENDIX B
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT CONSENT FORM
In this study of the effects of music on emotion, conducted by Nicole Buttermore and Dr. 
Lee Kirkpatrick, I understand that I will be asked to fill out a number of questionnaires 
about my personality and self-perceptions. I also know that I will be asked to follow 
instructions on an audiotape about making and appreciating music and that my responses 
to the task will be recorded. I further understand that I will be asked personal questions 
about myself, but I know that complete anonymity will be preserved and that my name 
will not be associated with my responses or any result of this study. I know that I may 
refuse to answer any question asked and that I may discontinue participation at any given 
time. I further understand that upon completion of my participation I will be given a full 
and complete explanation of this study and have the right to withdraw the use of my data 
at that time. I am aware that I may report dissatisfactions with any aspect of this 
experiment to the Psychology Department Chair (Dr. Larry Ventis, ext. 1-3897). I am 
aware that I must be at least 18 years of age to participate. My signature below signifies 
my voluntary participation in this study.
Signature Date
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APPENDIX C
ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE
Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement below by 
writing a number between 1 and 7 in the space provided.
l=Strongly 2=Disagree 3=Slightly 4=Neutral 5=Slightly 6=Agree 7=Strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree
  I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
  I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
  All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
  I am able to do things as well as most other people.
  I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
  I take a positive attitude toward myself.
  On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
  I wish I could have more respect for myself.
  I certainly feel useless at times.
  At times I think I am no good at all.
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APPENDIX D
SELF-PERCEIVED MATING SUCCESS SCALE
Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement below by 
writing a number between 1 and 7 in the space provided.
I=Strongly 2=Disagree 3=Slightly 4=Neutral 5=Slightly 6=Agree 7=Strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree
  Members of the opposite sex that I like, tend to like me back.
  Members of the opposite sex notice me.
  I receive many compliments from members of the opposite sex.
  Members of the opposite sex are not very attracted to me.
  I receive sexual invitations from members of the opposite sex.
  Members of the opposite sex are attracted to me.
  I can have as many sexual partners as I choose.
  I do not receive many compliments from members of the opposite sex.
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APPENDIX E
SELF-PERCEIVED SOCIAL STATUS SCALE (STUDY 1)
Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement below by 
writing a number between I and 7 in the space provided.
l=Strongly 2=Disagree 3=Slightly 4=Neutral 5=Slightly 6=Agree 7=Strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree
  I sometimes do favors for people to get on their good side.
  Members of my peer group respect and admire me.
  I defer to others when decisions have to be made.
  Others do not value my opinion.
  I feel inferior to members of my peer group.
  Members of my peer group do not want to be like me.
  I have high status in my social groups.
  There are some matters on which I am considered an expert by others.
  I own many things that others wish they had.
  People often “let it slide” when I fail to meet my obligations.
  I must admit that I try to see what others think before I take a stand.
  It is pretty easy for people to win arguments with me.
  Taking charge comes easily to me.
  I tend to dominate social situations.
  I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.
  I enjoy having control over others.
  I like to give orders.
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I do not like to compromise.
I believe I have to fight my way to the top.
I demand respect from members of my peer group. 
I am easily intimidated by dominant individuals.
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APPENDIX F 
INITIAL EMBARRASSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE IN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONDITIONS 
Please rate how you felt during the music exercise using the scale below:
1 = Not at all
2 = Slightly
3 = Somewhat
4 = Moderately
5 = Quite a bit
6 = Very
7 = Extremely
_______ Silly
- Bored
Embarrassed
Happy
Foolish
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APPENDIX G
FOLLOW-UP EMBARRASSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Please rate how you feel at this time by marking an X anywhere along each line. The 
researcher will look over your answers once you have completed this questionnaire.
I. Nervous
not at all 
2. Self-conscious
slightly moderately very
•
•  •  •
extremely
not at all 
3. Hostile
slightly moderately very extremely
not at all 
4. Foolish
slightly moderately very extremely
not at all 
5. Depressed
slightly moderately
•
•  •  •
very extremely
not at all 
6. Embarrassed
slightly moderately very extremely
: : ••  •  * •  •  • #  J
not at all slightly moderately very extremely
7. Calm
not at all slightly moderately very extremely
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